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The nuclear-based Cooper-Chloride (Cu-Cl) thermochemical cycle a promising method for 
future large-scale hydrogen generation. The nuclear-based hydrogen generation leads to 
new challenge for system safety due to the complexity of the co-generation system. In this 
research, a PSA-based framework for safety assessment and safety management of the 
nuclear-based hydrogen generation system is developed to perform a risk-informed design 
for Cu-Cl cycle. Two major safety challenges, LOCA and the hydrogen accidents, are 
analyzed in details with the PSA-based safety management framework. The PSA study 
shows that nuclear risks are effectively reduced by the reactor safety system, while the 
major risk is the hydrogen accidents. Based on the safety assessment result, safety 
instrumented system (SIS) is designed to control the hydrogen accidents. Different SIS 
configurations are compared numerically, which demonstrate the advantages of PSA-based 
methodology in controlling the uncertainty of the safety study. 
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This chapter presents the background, motivations, and objectives of the research for 
developing an integrated PSA-based framework for safety assessment and safety 
management of nuclear-based hydrogen generation with Cu-Cl cycle, as well as the 
organization of the thesis. 
 Background of Research 
Hydrogen energy is a clean energy source that could provide a solution for the current 
energy problems such as global climate change, air pollution, and depleting fossil energy 
resources [1]. Hydrogen is the least polluting fuel of all natural or synthetic fuels. It is 
aboundant throughout the world. There are many methods to generate hydrogen, such as 
conversion of biomass and wastes, biological water splitting, photoelectrochemical water 
splitting, solar thermal water splitting and renewable electrolysis [2]. Nuclear-based 
hydrogen generation is one of the candidate solutions for large-scale hydrogen production 
in the future. Nuclear-based hydrogen production requires no fossil fuels, which results in 
lower greenhouse-gas emissions. The nuclear-based hydrogen production could lend itself 
to large-scale generation and has lower cost and higher efficiency compared with other 
methods.  
Many nuclear-based hydrogen generation processes have been investigated in the world. 
One of these processes is the Cooper-Chloride (Cu-Cl) thermochemical cycle, which is 




plant is shown in Figure 1.1 [3]. The high energy-efficiency of 45% and low temperature-
requirement makes Cu-Cl thermochemical cycle a promising method for future large scale 
generation of hydrogen energy [4, 5]. The Cu-Cl cycle is a set of closed loop chemical 
reactions for clean hydrogen generation from the thermochemical decomposition of water 
into hydrogen and oxygen. The intermediate copper and chloride compounds are recycled 
and reused within the thermochemical loop to continuously generate hydrogen without 
emitting pollutions and greenhouse gases.   
 




The study of coupling the Cu-Cl cycle with a Generation IV Supercritical Water Reactor 
(SCWR), namely CANDU-SCWR, is carried out by UOIT and other organizations in 
Canada. The CANDU-SCWR uses super critical water (SCW) as the coolant for the nuclear 
reactor at pressure up to 25MPa and outlet temperature as high as 625˚C [6], which makes 
it possible to function as an energy source to power the Cu-Cl cycle. 
However, the nuclear-based hydrogen generation leads to new challenge for system safety. 
On one hand, the hydrogen production facility is a new load for the nuclear reactor. The 
interconnection between a nuclear core and the Cu-Cl cycle is through a direct heat transfer 
loop. This new configuration carries external risks to the reactors through a direct heat-
transferring loop interconnected with the reactor’s coolant system. To avoid any potential 
severe nuclear accident due to malfunction of the hydrogen plant, the impact of hydrogen 
plant on the nuclear reactor safety should be carefully studied during all life cycle stages 
of the nuclear-based hydrogen generation project. On the other hand, the hydrogen 
production facility is a set of complex chemical processes, which inevitably exposes to 
internal process risks such as fires, explosions, releases of toxic or flammable chemicals. 
Project safety management to reduce the overall risks in the co-generation plant into an 
acceptable level should handle both the internal and external risks involved in the 
thermochemical water splitting process. 
 Motivation of Thesis 
Safety management involves a set of principles, analysis, regulations and decisions to 




a process or a system. It is essential to follow regulatory rules and criteria to build a 
hydrogen generation system with high level of safety. Probabilistic safety assessment 
(PSA) methodology has been used successfully in nuclear area and other fields as a 
powerful tool to assess safety and provide important information for decision-makings on 
design, development, operation, and maintenance of plants and facilities. In this thesis, a 
PSA-based safety management framework is developed to perform risk-informed design 
for the system safety of nuclear-based hydrogen generation and to control the potential 
risks within the hydrogen production process. The application of PSA methodology for 
safety assessment and safety management on the Cu-Cl cycle is presented to address the 
potential safety issues in a nuclear-based hydrogen production plant.  
 Objective of Thesis 
The objective of the thesis is listed as below. 
 Develop an integrated framework for safety assessment and safety management of 
nuclear-based hydrogen production based on the PSA methodology 
 Application of PSA-based methodology to perform a preliminary safety assessment 
of nuclear-based hydrogen production plant to identify the major challenge for 
safety and the weakness of the current design 
 Design and verification of  safety instrumented systems (SIS) for risk prevention 





 Organization of Thesis 
The thesis is organized as follows: in chapter 1, the background, motivation, and objective 
for this thesis are provided. In chapter 2, a literature review is performed to investigate the 
most recent research findings in the fields of safety assessment and management of nuclear-
based hydrogen production. The integrated framework for safety analysis and safety 
management based on PSA methodology is described in chapter 3. The following two 
chapters present the practical application of PSA-based methodology in the nuclear-based 
hydrogen production. The preliminary safety assessment processes and corresponding 
results are shown in chapter 4 and the design and verification of safety instrumented 
systems is represented in chapter 5. The conclusions and the recommendations for future 

























 Literature review 
This chapter reviews the previous findings related to the PSA of nuclear power plant (NPP), 
SIS, and safety studies of nuclear-based hydrogen production.  
 PSA in Nuclear Power Industry 
2.1.1 Safety VS Reliability 
Reliability and safety are both important features of systems. In safety engineering, they 
are different but related concepts, and sometimes been misused and abused. Reliability is 
the probability that an item will satisfactorily function over a period of time under given 
conditions. It refers to the occurrence frequency of a failure in a component or system. 
Safety is a combination of reliability, and the degree and consequences of failure. Safety 
represents the probability and ability of a system to keep freedom from the conditions that 
can cause injury, death, and loss of property or environmental damage under stated 
conditions in a specified period. In the safety engineering view, all failures challenge the 
reliability of a system. However, not all failures challenge the system safety. In other 
words, the set of failures for safety must be a subset of failures for reliability [7]. An 
example to illustrate the relation of safety and reliability is that many systems are designed 
to fail into a safe state. Even though some part of a system fails to function, the system 




2.1.2 Overview of PSA in Nuclear Power Industry 
The PSA studies are not only a tool to quantitatively evaluate the risks in a system. They 
also provide important insights for safety management on design, operation, and 
maintenance of engineering systems. The first successful story of PSA application in 
nuclear power industry is the Reactor Safety Study WASH-1400 carried out for nuclear 
safety [8]. The objective of WASH-1400 is to numerically estimate individual and 
population accident risks from the operation of US commercial nuclear power plants. This 
study concluded that human factors have the most significant impact on the reactor 
accidents, and the small break loss of coolant accident (SBLOCA) is the major threatening 
initiating event for Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR). Four years after WASH-1400’s first 
publication, this conclusion was proved by a severe nuclear meltdown accident in one of 
the two Three Mile Island nuclear reactors. Since then, PSA has been applied for safety 
study of many existing nuclear plants, and for the design and licensing of new plants in 
nuclear power industry. In addition, the PSA methodology has been adopted by many other 
industries including the process industry, transportation industry, space industry, where the 
system has safety critical functions.  
PSA provides a systematic framework for safety analysis of nuclear power plant. It is a 
numerical evaluation method for assessing the risks and accident sequences in a nuclear 
power plant, which assists safety related decision-making process in all stages of the 
nuclear power plant life cycle. PSA follows a consistent and integrated approach to 




conditions. In real industrial engineering project, fault tree analysis (FTA) and event tree 
analysis (ETA) are most commonly used method in the PSA study for the system.  
2.1.3 Three PSA Levels  
In application of PSA on nuclear power industry, three levels PSA are internationally 
accepted by in the nuclear safety engineers all over the world. They are briefly summarized 
as follows: 
2.1.3.1 PSA Level 1 
The level 1 PSA in nuclear safety is the initial level of a PSA [9] for nuclear reactor. All 
PSA study of existing nuclear power plant or new nuclear plant design starts with a level 1 
PSA. The level 1 PSA focuses on the assessment of causes and consequences for severe 
nuclear accidents in plant design and operation, which could cause core damage of the 
nuclear reactor. The Level 1 PSA task involves initiating events identification, system 
modeling, and accident sequence quantification. The level 1 PSA determines the frequency 
of nuclear core damage and the contributor of potential risks to the overall probability of 
this accident. Both the initiating events, system conditions and responses of safety systems 
in the accident sequences, such as shutdown system response, reactor cooling system 
reactions and human factors, are assessed numerically in this level of PSA. The level 1 
PSA reveals the weakness of the NPP design and provides essential information for safety 
improvement to prevent the accident. The level 1 PSA also provide initiating information 




2.1.3.2 PSA Level 2 
Level 2 PSA starts with the result already undertaken in Level 1 PSA [10]. Level 2 PSA 
also addresses the issue of reactor’s core damage accident, but mainly performs the post-
accident assessment for the response of reactor containment and its related systems, such 
as the containment building and the containment cooling system. Level 2 PSA is integrated 
with the Level 1 results, to determinate the quantities and frequencies of radionuclides 
released to the environment after a core damage accident. The level 2 PSA provides a 
deeper insight into the strength and weakness of the nuclear containment integrity, which 
helps the improvement of containment safety design. The level 2 PSA provides information 
for improvements in prevention and mitigation of radionuclides releases in a severe core 
damage accident.  
2.1.3.3 PSA Level 3 
Started with the result undertaken in level 1 and level 2 PSA, the level 3 PSA [11] gives a 
full scope of the long-term distribution of radionuclides to the environment and the off-site 
risks to public health and environment due to postulated accidents. The level 3 PSA covers 
a broad range assessment in health and socioeconomic impacts leading from the post-
accident release.    
2.1.4 PSA in Canadian NPP 
The national standards for nuclear PSA practice in Canada have been published by 




safety of existing and new design of NPP in Canada. The important PSA-related standards 
in Canada are summarized below. 
2.1.4.1 RD-337: Design of New Nuclear Power Plants 
The standard RD-337: Design of New Nuclear Power Plants [12] figures out the design 
expectations of the new water-cooled NPP. RD-337 provides criteria for nuclear safety 
designs, as well as examples of possible optimization of design characteristics. RD-337 is 
built on the fundamental principles proposed by the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) in NS-R-1: Safety of Nuclear Plants: Design [13]. Besides just fitting these 
principles into Canadian nuclear practices, the RD-337 goes beyond the scope of NS-R-1 
by considering a broad range of interactions between NPP design and other issues, such as 
environmental protection, radiation protection, ageing and human factors. RD-337 gives 
three quantitative safety goals for Canadian NPP, and both the deterministic and 
probabilistic analysis methods to ensure these safety goals are discussed. The three 
quantitative safety goals for NPP in Canada are: 
 Core damage frequency (CDF): “the sum of frequencies of all event consequences 
that can lead to significant core degradation is less than 10-5 per reactor year.” 
 Small release frequency (SRF): “the sum of frequencies of all event sequences that 
can lead to a release to the environment of more than 1015 Becquerel of iodine-131 
is less than 10-5 per reactor year. A greater release may require temporary 




 Large release frequency (LRF): “the sum of frequencies of all event sequences that 
can lead to a release to the environment of more than 1014 Becquerel of cesium-137 
is less than 10-6 per reactor year. A greater release may require long term relocation 
of the local population.” 
2.1.4.2 S-294: Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) for Nuclear 
Power Plants and Amendment 
The standard S-294: Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) for Nuclear Power Plants gives 
the fundamental regulatory requirement for PSA in Canadian NPP [14]. S-294 adopts the 
principle of three levels of PSA and requires a facility specific level 2 PSA to be performed 
for all NPPs designing or operating in Canada. Other regulatory rules specified by S-294 
include: the requirement of updating the PSA models every three years or right after major 
changes in the facility, the requirement of model accuracy and assessment accuracy, the 
requirement of analysis coverage and the requirement of CNSC acceptance of 
methodologies and tools to be used for NPP PSA. An amended vision of S-294 has been 
issued in May 2014, namely REGDOC-2.4.2, Safety Analysis: Probabilistic Safety 
Assessment (PSA) for Nuclear Power Plants [15]. The amendment addresses the lessons 
learned from the Fukushima nuclear event of March 2011, and responses to the findings 
from the CNSC Fukushima Task Force Report [16].More details for probabilistic safety 
management requirements in Canadian NPP are given by the new vision. The major 
changes of REGDOC-2.4.2 from S-294 in PSA basis includes: an extension of model 




specific initiating events and potential hazards, such as seismic hazards, external fires, 
external floods, high winds and severe weather conditions. 
2.1.4.3 Safety goals result of Canadian commercial NPP 
According the requirement of the nuclear safety standard, the PSA has been performed for 
the commercial NPPs. The safety goals achieved by some Canadian commercial NPP are 
represented in Table 2.1 [17]. 
Table 2.1 Safety goals result of Canadian commercial NPP 
 Bruce A Bruce B Darling Pick A Pick B 
Point 
Lepreau 
SCDF* 3.0E-5 2.5E-5 7.9E-6 3.6E-5 4.2E-6 8.6E-6** 
LRF* 8.9E-6 6.2E-8 5.2E-6 5.0E-8 3.9E-6 6.5E-8** 
* Internal events       **Post-refurbished state 
Although nuclear safety has been extensively studied, there are limited studies regarding 
the linkage of nuclear power plant with chemical process. Since the PSA methodology has 
been proven to successfully address safety issues for nuclear power plant, the application 
of PSA-based safety regulation could be extended to use for the safety management of a 
nuclear-based hydrogen generation system. 
 Safety Instrumented System and Functional Safety 
Safety combines both the reliability of a unit or system and the degree and consequences 




inherent reliability of components in the system by using components that are more 
reliable, reducing the complexity of system structure or having some level of redundancy 
in critical components and subsystems. Another way to improve system safety is to reduce 
the frequency of occurrence for unsafe sequences of failures by providing additional 
protections and mitigations against failures to minimize the occurrence probability of 
accidental sequences into an acceptable level. Safety instrumented system (SIS) is a set of 
hardware and software components which works as independent protection layers between 
a critical process and its environment to minimize process risks for public as low as 
reasonably practicable (ALARP) by performing single or multiple safety instrumented 
functions (SIF). The safety instrumented system refers to a range of different applications 
and systems, such as safety shutdown systems, interlock systems, burner management 
systems and emergency shutdown systems. 
2.2.1   IEC 61508 Standard 
IEC 61508 [18] is an international standard issued by International Electrotechnical 
Commission (IEC) to regulate the application of SIS for functional safety. Functional 
safety is the part of overall system safety, which depends on a correct response of a system 
or equipment to its inputs. IEC 61508 specifies the requirements on all life cycle stages of 
a SIS, including system design, development and certification stages. IEC61508 is the 
generic functional safety standard that covers all kinds of industries. IEC 61508 gives a 
realistic view of risks and safety in a process:  




 safety must be planned in the beginning of a project 
 and the non-tolerable risks should be reduced to the acceptable level 
IEC 61508 is a generic standard, and several industry specified standards have been 
developed based on requirements of IEC 61508. IEC 61511 [19] provides requirements 
and recommendations in the functional safety of process industries. IEC 62061 [20] is 
written to address machinery-specific safety issues. IEC 61513 [21] specifies the 
application of IEC 61508 in the nuclear industry. 
2.2.1.1 Safety Integrity Level 
Safety Integrity Level (SIL) is the numerically scaled indicator for levels of risk reduction. 
IEC 61508 defines four SILs to represent the ability of risk reduction of a system, which 
associated with probability of failure on demand (PFD) for low demand systems and 
probability of dangerous failure per hour (PFH) for system working in a high demand 
mode. The SILs and demand modes required for different SIS are shown in Table 2.2, 






















SIL 4 10-4 to 10-5 10-8 to 10-9 100000 to 10000 
SIL 3 10-3 to 10-4 10-7 to 10-8 10000 to 1000 
SIL 2 10-2 to 10-3 10-6 to 10-7 1000 to 100 
SIL 1 10-1 to 10-2 10-5 to 10-6 100 to 10 
 
2.2.1.2 IEC 61513 Standard 
IEC 61503 is the interpretation of IEC 61508 in the nuclear sector. This standard specifies 
the framework of SIS design of computer-based systems and the application of functional 
safety in computer-based nuclear system. Unlike other IEC 61508 based standards, the 
concept of SIL is avoid to use in IEC 61513 to classify the risk reduction levels of SIS. 
Instead, three classes of the computer-based I&C system are defined to map the system 
into equivalent function categories, based on deterministic criteria and engineering 
judgment about degree and consequences of failures. While, Only Class 1 systems are 
allowed to use for the most safety intensive applications such as the protection systems and 
safety actuation systems. Moreover, the usage of class 2 and class 3 must be limited in non-
critical application such as control systems and HMI systems. Although different 
conceptual basis of safety classification are used, the safety life cycle of SIS in nuclear 




2.2.2 SIL Assessment 
Evaluation of SIL for SISs has been extensively studied as an important issue. IEC 61508 
framework requires a quantitative determination of SIL for verification and certification of 
any SIS. The complex features of SISs mainly cause the difficulty for SIL evaluation. The 
complexity of SISs embodied in two aspects, the structural complexity and the operational 
complexity. For one thing, SIS is complex engineering system which consists of a set of 
hardware and software subsystems including actuators, controllers, sensors and software 
components, and involves levels of redundancies to achieve fault tolerance. The system 
safety models should represent all component faults and their effects to system reliability. 
Meanwhile, external events such as fire and human factor need to be considered in some 
cases. Complexity of system structures leads to complexity in system modeling and 
reliability calculation. For another thing, the operations and functions of SIS are 
complicated. All operating states of the SIS such as diagnosis, proof test, maintenance, and 
repair would have direct impact on the system safety availability. So far, various PSA based 
methods has been studied to handle the complexity in evaluating SIL. 
To address this problem for SIL assessment, some studies are focused on development of 
the advanced system modeling methods to handle the complexity in system safety 
modeling. FTA based approach has been proposed to model time-dependent system 
behavior by introducing the distribution of periodically tested component in conventional 
FTA [22]. Markov models [23] [24] are used for SIL assessment as a solution for modeling 




handle the uncertainties in safety system performance. To reduce the complexity of the 
structural-oriented modeling process, an alternative approach has been proposed to build a 
system model by functional-oriented means [26]. Computer aided system modeling tools 
has been develop for automatically creation of Markov models for system reliability 
analysis [27].  
Other researches are aimed at the safety assessment of hardware and software integrations 
in SISs. The difficulty in modeling hardware and software integration is due to the 
difference in the nature of failures. Hardware has a time-related failure rate due to the 
hardware wear out process. Failure occurs when some form of stress exceeds the associated 
strength of the product. While software is a collection of instructions, which enables a 
system to perform a specific task based on hardware platform, and it cannot work alone 
without hardware. Software failure mechanisms are different from hardware failures in that 
all software failures are caused by residual design defects. 
In IEC 61508, the software reliability of safety instrumented systems is qualified according 
to the life cycle management in the software development and testing. Unlike the 
probabilistic assessment approach used in hardware SIL evaluation, the software SIL 
assessment follows a   deterministic approach. The reason why quantitative assessment is 
not widely used for software reliability is because the lack of a good model to reflect the 
software reliability behavior. The software behavior in reliability and safety is very hard to 
model with mathematical models, especially in the safety critical tasks where extremely 
low or zero failure rates are allowed. However, a lot of effort has been made to seek for a 




The most popular software reliability modeling method is the reliability growth model. 
This model is based on the assumption that reliably of software will increase after a bug is 
removed. To use growth model in the critical application, a hybrid approach for software 
reliability quantification has been proposed for the software used in nuclear safety systems 
[28]. The approach combines the software verification and mutation testing for quantitative 
software reliability evaluation with the reliability growth model. The possibility and 
limitations of using software is discussed in [29], problems such as the sensitivity of 
inherent failure number estimation and lack of failure data in critical software in revealed. 
To assess the effect of developer’s skills and experience to the final reliability of software 
product, an advanced growth model has been proposed by considering the human factor 
when building the software model [30].  
The reliability growth models used to estimate the software reliability require a failure 
history, while the software for safety system has a much higher reliability than general-
purpose software that rarely or never fails during testing. To overcome this difficulty, 
another approach for software reliability modeling, namely the input domain based model 
or domain based model [31], could be used for safety critical software modeling. The input 
domain based models treat the software as a functional black box, in which failures are 
only caused by the fault related software inputs. Software reliability is estimated by 
evaluating the occurrence probability of fault related inputs in the completely input domain 
of software. The Bayesian networks have also been investigated to use in the reliability 




software reliability is achieved by the Bayesian interference of the safety related parameters 
of the software system.  
 Safety Management in Nuclear-based Hydrogen 
Generation 
Nowadays, about 97% of the hydrogen production is generated by reforming fossil fuels, 
such as coal and methane. Establishing low-cost methods of generating hydrogen in large-
scale is a key challenge of future hydrogen utilization. A promising technology of large-
scale hydrogen production is thermochemical cycle based hydrogen production. 
2.3.1 Cooper-Chloride (Cu-Cl) Thermochemical Cycle 
The Cooper-Chloride (Cu-Cl) cycle consists of a set of chemical reactions to form a closed 
internal loop cycle to generate hydrogen from the thermochemical decomposition of water 
into hydrogen and oxygen. The intermediate copper and chloride compounds are recycled 
and reused within the thermochemical loop to continuously generate hydrogen without 
emitting pollutions and greenhouse gases. There are different variations of Cu-Cl cycles 
based on the thermochemical water splitting: five-step reactions, four-step reactions, and 
three-step reactions [33]. But they all have the same overall reaction: 
H2O(g)→H2(g)+1/2O2(g).   
This thesis is focused on the configuration of a four-step Cu-Cl cycle, which has been 
integrated and demonstrated for lab scale hydrogen production in the Clean Energy 




cycle are given in Table 2.3.The process flow diagram of 4-step Cu-Cl cycle is shown in 
Figure 2.1. 
Table 2.3 Reactions in the four-step Cu-Cl cycle 












4. Oxygen production Cu2OCl2(s) →2CuCl(l)+1/2O2(g) 500 
 
The maximum temperature required for Cu-Cl cycle is 530˚C. One of the candidate nuclear 
reactors  as the energy source for the Cu-Cl thermochemical cycle is the SuperCritical 
Water-cooled Nuclear Reactor (SCWR). The SCWR is a Generation IV nuclear reactor, 
which uses SuperCritical light Water (SCW) as the coolant at pressure up to 25MPa and 






Figure 2.1 Process flow diagram of 4-step Cu-Cl cycle [34] 
 
2.3.2 Other Thermochemical Cycles 
Other Thermochemical cycles under development by other research organizations are 
listed in Table 2.4 as alternative solutions for nuclear-based hydrogen production [35]. As 
shown in Table 2.4, the major advantage of Cu-Cl cycle over other thermochemical cycles 













Sulfur-iodine 827-900 4 42-51 
Hybrid sulfur Not Given 3 41-53 
Sulfur-bromine 
hybrid 
Not Given 4 39 
UT-3 750 4 40-50 
Ca-Br-Star 750 3 44 
Iron-chlorine 650 3 47-49 
Copper –sulfur 
hybrid 
827 5 86-73 





2.3.3 Summary of Safety Studies in Nuclear-Based Hydrogen 
Generation  
Many researches on different thermochemical cycles for nuclear-based hydrogen 
generation have been carried out and most of these researches are focused on the area of 
thermochemical, thermal hydraulic, material, energy efficiency, and process simulation. 
The researches on the safety aspect of nuclear-based generation are limited, even though 
safety plays a very important role on both the nuclear side and the hydrogen side. This 
section will briefly review the existing works and achievements of safety studies in nuclear-
based hydrogen generation system.  
2.3.3.1 General safety analysis 
The general safety issue for nuclear-based hydrogen production has been discussed in [36]. 
This study is not specific to any existing thermochemical cycle; however, it investigates 
the potential risks in worldwide nuclear-based hydrogen production activities and gives a 
generic overview of the potential safety challenges in future large scale hydrogen 
production. A comparison between the hydrogen and other conventional fuel gas is 
reported in this study, and current standards of the hydrogen safety are reviewed to point 
out the major safety concerns when using hydrogen in large scale as new energy.  
Another report for the general safety issue comes from US researchers [37]. It is a study 
about the feasibility of nuclear-based hydrogen production with existing NPP. This report 




the economics, generation, storage, and transportation. The regulatory issues for hydrogen 
safety are the major safety concern of this study. It is reported that the existing standards 
and codes for hydrogen safety is mainly concerns about the hydrogen safety associated 
with fuel stations and hydrogen storage facilities, which deals with the safety in application 
of relatively small amount of hydrogen. As discussed in the report, no standard is available 
now to address the safety issue with large-scale production of hydrogen. It is highly 
recommended that such standard need to be develop to meet the requirements for future 
commercial scale hydrogen generation. Issues such as explosion, waste, toxicity, and 
location are also discussed in this work. 
2.3.3.2 PSA in safety assessment of Hydrogen generation  
Hydrogen related safety has been studied by PSA-based methods. A PSA study has been 
carried out to investigate the separation requirements for hydrogen plant and NPP [38]. A 
risk-informed separation distance has been calculated through a PSA model of hydrogen 
explosion caused by failures of the on-site hydrogen storage facilities. A reactor’s core 
damage frequency due to hydrogen accidents has been reported as 7E-6 at the separation 
distance of 60m between hydrogen plant and NPP without additional mitigating features in 
between. The report also gives a comparison of core damage frequency with different 
separation distance and plants’ configurations. Similar study has been carried out by [39] 
but through a semi-quantitative analysis approach. In both studies, it is assumed that a large 
amount of hydrogen gas is stored in the hydrogen plant. However, from the safety point of 




the severity of hydrogen accident. Another available PSA is based on the conceptual design 
of hydrogen powered methane reforming process, which is theoretically not a 
thermochemical cycle [40]. An important finding from this paper is that in all the accidental 
outcomes, which could affect public health, the contributor of reactor core damage is very 
low, and the dominant risk in a nuclear-based hydrogen production process is the explosion 
of hydrogen, which contributes almost 90% to the total accident. The paper recommended 
the safety studies of nuclear-based hydrogen production should be concentrated on the 
hydrogen production plant.  
2.3.3.3 Computational fluid dynamics in the safety study 
Computational fluid dynamics (CFD) method has also been used in the safety assessment 
of hydrogen safety. Different from PSA based approach which models the probability and 
sequences of accident, the CFD study numerically simulates the accident scenario. A CFD 
based approach has been developed to determine the safety separation distance between 
nuclear plant and hydrogen facility [41].The CFD analysis models the overpressure of the 
hydrogen explosion, which is selected as the critical parameters by many hydrogen 
regulatory standards, to find a safe distance. In another application [42], the CFD method 
is used to perform a numerical simulation of the hydrogen and hydrogen chloride releasing 
from the Cu-Cl cycle. The flammable cloud formation process for hydrogen and the toxic 
cloud formation process for hydrogen chloride in a release scenario are modeled. In this 
model, only the release effect is considered, while the on-site storage of hydrogen is not 




of hydrogen in the plan, the pure hydrogen release accident could have minor impact on 
the nuclear power plant safety. 
2.3.3.4 PSA in SIS used in thermochemical cycle  
PSA has been demonstrated for designing and analyzing safety systems to mitigate the 
harmful sequence in accident associated with the nuclear-based hydrogen generation 
process [43]. In the previous researches, safety system is designed to stop or reduce the 
sequences of uncontrollable leakage of concentrated sulfuric acid in one reaction section 
of the S-I cycle. Multi-layers of protection systems are formed by three safety systems in 
the proposed solution. To optimize the proposed design, PSA is applied in reliability 
analysis of the safety structure to find the weakness part to be improved in the safety 
system.   
 Summary of Literature Review 
PSA aims at evaluating the risks and accident sequences of a system. It has been 
standardized to use in nuclear industry and has been widely adopted by many other 
industries. Risks in a system can be reduced by active systems, which perform some 
function to mitigate or stop accident sequences. This kind of system is defined as SIS which 
plays a very important role in safety. IEC 61508 is an international standard about SIS, 
which requires a PSA to be used for quantitative determination of SIL.  
Although safety is one of the major concerns in nuclear-based hydrogen generation, the 




studies show the great potential of using PSA methodology to improve safety of nuclear-
based hydrogen generation. To address the safety issues in nuclear-based hydrogen 
generation systems, an integrated framework of PSA-based safety assessment and 
management is developed in this thesis. Methodologies used in the PSA-based framework 




 PSA-based Safety Assessment and Management 
Framework 
This chapter describes the methods and tools used in the safety management of nuclear-
based hydrogen generation system. A PAS-based safety analysis and safety management 
framework is presented in this chapter. One of the greatest advantages of PSA-based 
methodology over other safety tools is the quantification of analysis results. The PSA 
results provide a more accurate insight of the safety features of systems, which are of great 
importance for decision-makings in design, development, optimization, validation, and 
certification of existing or new industrial systems. PSA could be used as a tool to assist 
safety management in all life cycle stages in a project. However, for project management, 
it is recommended that the safety should be considered as early as possible in a project 
design phase. The identification, control, and management of risks in early design stage of 
a project could efficiently reduce the unnecessary costs for system modification in later 
stages.  
The Cu-Cl cycle is in its early development stage, where the studies in the aspects such as 
chemical, energy, material and economic of Cu-Cl cycle are currently based on the ongoing 
researches about the conceptual designs and the lab scale demonstrations. Due to the 
limitations, such as uncertainty for design specifics, lack of available data and potential 
changes in future stages, qualitative and semi-quantitative safety analysis tools are always 
been used in an early design stage. The application of PSA in the early design phase of Cu-




preliminary results of the plant safety and use these achievements in safety management to 
help improving the system safety. 
This study focuses on the internal events in the nuclear-based hydrogen plant, while the 
external events such as floods, earthquakes, external fires, high winds, and thunders are not 
considered. In addition, this study aims at the short term and direct effects of accidents, 
such as system failures, release, fires, and explosions, during or after an accident. Long 
term accident scenarios such as long-term environmental effects and long-term public 
health effects, are not modeled and analyzed in this thesis.  
 Overview of PSA-Based Integrated Framework for 
Safety Management 
A PSA-based integrated framework for safety management is developed in this thesis. The 
flowchart of the PSA based safety management framework is shown in Figure 3.1. The 
major tasks in the PSA based safety management are: 
 A safety analysis and management process should be performed in the beginning 
of a new project or right after a critical change of design has been made. A safety 
study always starts with the identification of system to be analyzed. The main tasks 
in the system identification involve a study of system structure and system 
functions, defining system boundaries, collecting information from similar 
designs, and most importantly, make a decision whether a safety assessment is 
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 If a safety study is required to be made, the hazards and risks within the process 
should be analyzed to find the weakness and strength for the system. Based on the 
findings of the hazard and risk analysis, the initiating events for safety assessment 
are selected. The initiating events, which have potential risks to the system safety 
may be caused by a single failure or a combination of multiple faults and conditions 
within a system. To find the probability of causes of undesired events in the PSA-
based framework, a FTA is performed to model the failure process of the system 
and calculate the probability of the accident occurrence as the top-event value in 
the FTA.   
 The results of FTA would be used as the inputs for accident sequences analysis by 
the ETA. The purpose of ETA is to find all possible outcomes and their 
probabilities from an initiating accidental event. ETA considers more than just the 
inherent failures and risks in the system. More factors such as human behaviors, 
mitigation systems, environmental conditions, and emergency responses can be 
included in ETA when building the event tree. Besides the probability of 
occurrence for accident outcomes, the result of ETA also allows an investigation 
of the contributor of each accident to the total risks, the worst case scenario, the 
dominant risks, and the sensitivity of each sequence in an accident. 
 A decision of whether additional safety protection layers are needed can be made 
upon the findings from ETA. This could be done by comparing the ETA results 
with the design basis or standards. In a safety view, all non-tolerable risks need to 




the layer of protection analysis (LOPA). LOPA performs a semi-quantitative 
assessment to find the residual risks or non-tolerable risks in the system after all 
risk mitigation efforts have been carried out. As a result, it is determined in this 
step whether a SIS is required and if SIS is required to use, what risk reduction 
level should the SIS have to maintain enough safety. 
 The international standard IEC 61508 standardizes the life cycle management of 
safety instrumented systems. The design and implementation of a SIS must follow 
the requirements and recommendations from IEC 61508, and all the design phases 
should be documented to prove the compliance of the standard. Technically, the 
risk reduction of a system or process could be achieved by reducing the occurring 
probability of the initiating events or by relieving the harmful risk sequences. A 
SIS always works as additional protection layers to prevent the occurrence of 
unsafe accident sequence. In addition, a quantitative SIL assessment must be 
carried out to ensure the required risk reduction level has been met with the SIS.  
The rest part of this chapter will provide technical details about the methodologies used 
for safety study. 
 Hazard and Risk Identification 
A safety life cycle always begins with the hazard and risk identification, follows by risk 
assessment, and finally finds solutions to control the risk. Hazard and risk identification 




of hazard and risk theory is critical. Although hazard and risk are always used 
interchangeable ways, there are essential differences between them. 
 Hazard is defined as “an unplanned event or series of events resulting in death, 
injury, occupational illness, or damage to or loss of equipment or property, or 
damage to the environment” [44]. Hazard is anything that can cause harm; it is the 
prerequisite for accident. Hazard is inadvertently built into systems, and it is a 
deterministic system property, not a random event. 
 Risk is defined as “an expression of the impact and possibility of a mishap in terms 
of potential mishap severity and probability of occurrence” [44]. Risk is the chance 
that a hazard can actually do harm. Risk is a probability related concept; it is both 
the likelihood and severity of hazard outcomes. The risk can be defined by the 
formula: 
Risk =Probability × Severity 
Hazard identification could be done by unbounded process or systematic and structured 
approach. The unbounded methods for hazard and risk identifications are performed with 
the expert judgment or brainstorm. The unbounded approach is easy to perform and it is 
good in identifying new hazard in novel designs. It is flexible to use in different types of 
systems. However, the accuracy and correctness of unbounded approach are heavily relied 





Systematic hazard identification method is widely used in mature projects and many tools 
for systematic hazard and risk analysis have been developed: 
 Hazard and operability study (HAZOP) is the most widely used hazard 
identification method and was developed by ICI in the late 1960s [45]. In HAZOP, 
the system is breaking down into subsystems based on the system function or 
structure. Critical parameters are selected and deviation guidewords are applied to 
each subsystem. The potential risks of these deviations is discussed and recorded. 
The system parameters could include anything the examiner may interest in: 
temperature, pressure, flow rate, level, speed, voltage, and current. Typical 
deviations might be: low, high, no, reverse, too low, too high, leakage, toxic, 
release, fire and explosion. A group of experts always conducts HAZOP and the 
parameters and guidewords need to be determined before the HAZOP. HAZOP can 
be used in a wide range of types of applications. The HAZOP will finally generate 
a detailed and auditable result. However, the HAZOP is usually time consuming 
and expensive and requires good preparation. 
  Failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) [46] is bottom-up deductive method for 
evaluating the effects of potential risks caused by failures in system. The purpose 
of FMEA is to identify failure modes of a system or subsystem, but it is also 
possible to perform FMEA in quantitative way by assigning the failure rate of each 
failure modes. A typical FMEA usually considers potential ways of failures, the 




 Hazard identification checklist is a list of known hazards or potential hazards. The 
listed hazards are derived from experience of risks assessment, history industrial 
data, or accident record for operation of similar systems. The hazard identification 
checklist should be prepared and authorized prior to use. Since potential risks are 
pre-listed, non-expert can use the checklist. However, disadvantage in using this 
approach is that the scope of analysis is limited by the risks listed in the checklist, 
so that it cannot reveal new hazard and risk, which are not pre-listed in the checklist. 
 Fault Tree Analysis 
FTA was first introduced by the Watson of Bell Telephone Laboratories for the safety 
assessment in the project of control system of Minuteman missile launching in 1961. It has 
been wildly used as an important tool for probabilistic safety assessment.  
3.3.1 Overview of FTA Methodology 
FTA is a deductive approach for system safety modeling and analysis that could be 
evaluated qualitatively or quantitatively. The fundamental concept of FTA is to logically 
and graphically represent of combinations of faults, which lead to the undesired events 
associated with system. The FTA creates a bottom-up tree structure that maps all logic 
paths for initiating failures to the undesired fault. In quantitative assessment, Boolean logic 





FTA is a systematic methodology for PSA. The theory behind the FTA is relatively simple 
and the application of FTA follows a straightforward approach, which make FTA suitable 
in modeling system failures for a wide range of industries. FTA provides a structured and 
layered approach to interpret combination of failures in a physical system into a logical 
diagram, which makes itself powerful to model a complex system.  
3.3.2 FTA Symbols and Mathematical Basis 
A FTA consists of the following steps: 
 Top event definition 
 Fault-tree construction 
 Qualitative evaluation 
 Quantitative evaluation 
A fault tree is composed of a set of symbols for events and gates, the common symbols for 
FTA [47] are shown in Table 3.1.  
To perform a quantitative evaluation with fault tree model, the probability is assigned for 
each basic event. The calculation process follows a bottom-up order to determine the 
probability of top events by applying Boolean logic to all combination of events through 





Table 3.1 FTA symbols  
Symbol Description 
 
Basic initiating event that no further development is required. 
 
An undeveloped event, lack of information for event causes or 
consequence, or no need to develop. 
 
Conditional event or probability. 
 
Normal system condition, usually not a failure. 
 
AND Gate. The output occurs only when all input events occurs 
together. 
 
OR Gate. The output occurs if any input occurs. 
 
Exclusive OR Gate. The output occurs if only one input occurs. 
 




 Event Tree Analysis (ETA) 
Unlike the deductive approach applied for FTA, ETA is an inductive method, which 
determines all possible outcomes and their probability of occurrence resulting from an 
initiating event. The system modeling process of ETA is different from FTA. In FTA, the 
cause and probability of a specific undesired event is modeled with all possible 
combinations of initiating events and conditions.  
In contrast, the ETA is a top-down modeling process, which develops subsequent responses 
and their outcomes from a given initiating event. In system safety modeling, a combination 
of FTA and ETA is always used to develop a whole scope of system behavior in accident. 
Event tree models the system response and accident sequences, and fault tree evaluates the 
probability of different system behaviors in the case of an accident. 
The ETA was first proposed and introduced in large-scale application by WASH-1400 [8]. 
In the WASH-1400 study, people realized the fault tree models for nuclear power plants 
growing too large to handle when several sequences are introduced into fault tree modeling. 
ETA is developed as an alternative method for FTA in modeling the outcomes from an 
accident. 
A typical event tree usually has three components: initiating events, intermediate events, 
and end-state events. The initiating event is the root of event tree models. It is a state or 
condition of the system, which starts an undesired accident sequences. Intermediate events 




intermediate events are split into binary (yes/no) or mutually exclusive branches (multi-
state), which means the events, which are represented by the branches, cannot occur at the 
same time. The end-state event is a condition of system when a harmful outcome is reached 
which cannot develop further or the point at which analysis of accident sequences is 
planned to stop. An ETA usually involves all or part of the following steps: 
 System identification: define the system to analysis and system boundaries. 
 Define the initiating events: system hazard and risk analysis to define possible 
initiating events. 
 Define intermediate events: system response associated with initiating events. 
 Build event tree: starting from initiating events until all end-states are reached. 
 Obtaining probabilities for events: FTA can be used to calculate the probabilities. 
 Quantitative assessment: determination of outcomes and their probabilities. 
 Documentation: all analysis process should be documented and updated if new 
information is required.  
The ETA represents the cause and effective of accident sequences in a visual way. It can 
be performed in different degrees of details. The major advantage of ETA for system safety 
modeling is its ability to model various responses from a wide range of subsystems 




simultaneously for a complex engineering system to develop different accident scenarios. 
.  
 Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) 
The methodology of layers of protection analysis (LOPA) was first developed in 1990’s 
when the SISs begins to become popular in safety management for different industries. The 
development of LOPA in history first started with the concept of layers of protection. The 
Center of Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) first proposed the concept of layers of 
protection and methods to determine the required number of layers in 1993. Later on, the 
procedures to perform LOPA were developed by some companies to solve practical 
problems. In addition, in 2001, a book was published by CCPS to describe the LOPA [48]. 
LOPA is typically a semi-quantitative safety assessment methodology that usually applied 
after a hazard and risk identification analysis to determine the required SIL for risk control 
and mitigation. The reason why LOPA is defined as semi-quantitative is because the 
numerical risk assessment is performed in the assessment approach and numbers as risk 
probabilities are used in the analysis. However, the numbers used for failure probability is 
usually selected to an order of magnitude level of accuracy. This would increase the 
uncertainty in the assessment result. To handle the uncertainty with assessment, an 
overestimating result is always expected to achieve from LOPA by taking the risks as large 




To understand the theory behind LOPA, let us introduce the concept of independent 
protection layer (IPL) first. IPLs are systems, components, alarms, or actions against 
accidents, that when challenged by risks, designated functions are performed to preventing 
the accident sequences from reaching an unsafe end-state. The IPL requires each protection 
layer be completely independent of other protection layers, so the failures in one 
independent protection layer could not affect the functions in other layers. Each layers of 
protection has a safety integrated function (SIF) which is designed to avoid the occurrence 
of undesired events or mitigate the sequences from an initiating event. The risk reduction 
process with IPLs is shown in Figure 3.2, where the risk reduction factor of each IPL is 












Figure 3.2 IPL for risk reduction 
 
The modeling process and mathematical basis of LOPA and ETA are similar. However, 




modeling all the causes and sequences of an accident. It considers all possible accident 
scenarios derives from an initiating event. It is a structured diagram representation of 
failures and effects in an existing system.  
The LOPA is developed to evaluate the prevention and mitigation actions of a system and 
its protection layers against a specific accident. The role of LOPA in safety management 
is to investigate how risks are reduced within different protection layers and what is the 
effect of failures in protection layers. 
If the LOPA indicates that the potential risks associated with a system or process cannot 
be tolerated with the current design. Then an effort must be made either to modify the 
design for more reliable structure or to reinforce the current design with additional 
protection layers. The risk reduction from design modification is always insufficient and 
costly in real industrial applications due to limitations of inherent features of system. Thus, 
in real application, a SIS is always designed as an additional protection layer. The design 
and implementation requirements are specified by IEC 61508 standard. As required by the 
standard a quantitative determination the SIL is of great importance in safety management 
of a project to ensure the overall safety reduction with the SIS. Because the correct 
functioning of SIS gives the last chance to bring the process back to a safe condition, in the 




 SIL Assessment 
IEC 61508 uses the term of modes of operation to describe two types of safety functions 
implemented in SIS: 
 The average probability of a dangerous failure on demand (low demand mode); 
 The average frequency of a dangerous failure per hour (high demand or continuous 
mode). 
Low demand mode is the SIS whose demand frequency of safety instrumented function 
(SIF) is less than once per year. 
High demand or continuous mode is a SIS working condition where the demand frequency 
of SIF is more than once per year. 
As a safety study on early design stage for nuclear-based hydrogen generation system, only 
the severe accident cases, which have most harmful consequences to the public, are 
considered in this thesis. The occurrence frequencies of severe accident are assumed lower 
than once per year, which will be proved in the analysis from following chapters. So, in 
this thesis, the SIL assessment for low demand mode is mainly discussed. The terms used 
to describe system reliability and safety, are listed in Table 3.2  [49]. 
 T1: Proof test interval (h) 




 β: The fraction of undetected failures that have a common cause  
 βD: The fraction of those failures that are detected by the diagnostic tests, the 
fraction that have a common cause  
 λ D: Dangerous failure rate (per hour) of a channel in a subsystem, equal 0.5 λ 
(assumes 50 % dangerous failures and 50 % safe failures) 
 λDD: Detected dangerous failure rate (per hour) of a channel in a subsystem (this 
is the sum of all the detected dangerous failure rates within the channel of the 
subsystem) 
 λDU: Undetected dangerous failure rate (per hour) of a channel in a subsystem (this 
is the sum of all the undetected dangerous failure rates within the channel of the 
subsystem) 
 PFDG: Average probability of failure on demand for the group of voted channels 
 tCE: Channel equivalent mean down time (hour) for 1oo1, 1oo2, 2oo2 and 2oo3 
architectures (this is the combined down time for all the components in the channel 
of the subsystem) 
 tGE: Voted group equivalent mean down time (hour) for 1oo2 and 2oo3 architectures 
(this is the combined down time for all the channels in the voted group) 








                                        (3.1) 
3.6.1 Analytical Approach and Simplified Equations 
Theoretically, SISs have a physical structure similar as other control systems, so most 
system reliability and safety modeling methods, such as Markov model, fault tree model, 
and reliability block diagram model, can be used for SIL assessment for SISs. In analytical 
evaluating approach, the SIL is derived directly from these system models of SIS. However, 
the complexity in system modeling and large amount of computations in system safety 
calculation makes the analytical approach inefficient to use in real project. To reduce the 
time and cost for SIL calculation, simplified equations are used alternatively to get an 
approximate evaluating result. The approximation result is able to meet the accuracy 
requirement in the analysis of industrial engineering systems. An example of simplified 
PFD calculation equation for a 1oo1 (1 out of 1) component is shown below:   





















In the system level analysis, the PFDG for an integrated system, which consist of sensors, 
logic solvers, and final elements, is calculated by adding the PFDG value of different 
subsystems together., 
PFDG = PFDs + PFDL + PFDFE                                                    (3.4) 
The simplified equations are derived based on the approximation in the calculation of 
failure probability. It is assumed that the component used in SIS has a constant failure rate 
λ. The probability of failure occurs in this component or subsystem has an exponential 
distribution, which is: 
tefailureP 1)(                                             (3.5) 
Given a sufficiently small value x, the exponential 
xe  can be approximated as: 
 xe
x 1                                                        (3.6) 
Rearrangement of the equation gives: 
xex 1                                                         (3.7) 
Substituting x with t , yields: 




3.6.2 Software Reliability for SIS 
Software plays a more and more important role in the SISs, because most control functions 
generated by the programmable logic controllers are software-based functions. The safety 
functions performed by the SIS require an interaction between hardware and software, in 
which the software processes the reading of the sensors and gives an output as the control 
signal to the equipment under control (EUC). The SIS will fail into a dangerous condition 
if the software has an incorrect response to the hazardous event when the SIS is expected 
to perform a safety function.  
Unlike the hardware safety as discussed above, quantitative software safety assessment is 
not used in IEC 61508. Instead, the standard adopted a quality assurance approach for 
software safety, where the more stringent requirements put on the software the more 
reliable functions could be achieved. An input domain model based software testing 
approach is proposed in this thesis to address the problem of software safety in a 
quantitative way. 
3.6.2.1 Input Domain Based Model 
In the input domain based model [30], n inputs are randomly selected form the input data 
set E=(Ei: i=1, 2, … , N), where Ei is the subset of software input domain. The inputs are 
sampled with the input distribution of operational profile P=(Pi: i=1, 2, … , N); where Pi is 
the probability of choosing Ei as the input. If f failures are found in the execution of n inputs, 




nfR /1                                                              (3.9) 
When testing software with its input domain subsets, a prior knowledge of the system 
operational profile is required. The operational profile is a quantitative characterization of 
how the software is used in the real application. Musa [50] proposed a systematic approach 
to develop the operation profile for software testing. In the application of safety critical 
software test, the operational profile could be developed according to the operational 
history of plant or by expert knowledge. If the input distribution of the software is unknown, 
then the operational profile can be developed by assuming a uniform input distribution over 
the software input domain. 
In a software and hardware integrated SIS, to have the SIS response successfully for a 
demand, the hardware should work in a failure-free condition and the software should 
process the output properly as designed and give a correct control command to hardware. 
Failures in either hardware or software could cause a failure on demand for the SIS. To 
represent in Boolean logic, the system will fail when “hardware fails” OR “software fails”. 
Let us use the term PFDhw to indicate the PFD for hardware subsystem and PFDsw to 
indicate the PFD for software, where PFDhw can be calculated from the equations given 
from IEC 61508 or analytical approaches, and the PFDsw is the software reliability R 
determined with software testing. The PFD for system PFDsys is expressed with the 
equation: 













,      (3.11) 
As discussed above, the software reliability is time-independent, PFDsw can be treated as 
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PFD                                         (3.13) 
The SIS has a high reliability, so the PFD,hw,G is a small value . An approximation can be 
used to derive an simplified equation for practical application, for PFD,hw,G<<1, PFD,hw,G+1
≈1. Thus, equation 3.13 can be rewritten as: 
GhwGsysSW PFDPFDPFD ,,                                      (3.14) 
The average PFD for software (PFDSW), is calculated from the system average PFD and 
the average PFD for hardware. This PFDSW is used as the stop criteria for software testing. 




be derived with the simplified equation given by IEC 61508, and the PFDSW,G can be 
determined by substituting equation 3.4 into equation 3.14, which gives: 
 FElSGsysGhwGsysSW PFDPFDPFDPFDPFDPFDPFD  ,,,         (3.15) 
Where PFDsys,G is the PFD limit for given SILs, which is 10
-1 for SIL1,  10-2 for SIL2, 10-
3 for SIL3 and 10-4 for SIL4. 
The software reliability PFDSW is ensured by the software reliability demonstration testing 
(SRDT). 
3.6.2.2 Software Reliability Demonstration Test 
Numerically, if no fault is detected from the software test, then the reliability of software 
can be estimated as 1. However, a real software product will never get a 100% reliability 
unless the responses for all possible combinations of inputs are tested to be correct, which 
requires an infinite test. It is impossible to demonstrate software reliability with infinite 
test, due to the limitation of time and cost for testing. A decision must be made to stop the 
testing and put the system into operation. A Bayesian stopping rule [51] for safety critical 
software testing is proposed to calculate the minimal testing requirements for a stated SIL. 
There are only two possible outcomes for each test case: fail or pass. If the SIS performs 
correctly when a safety function is on demand, then test is passed. While, if the system fails 
to response properly for a safety function demand, the test is failed. Assuming the value of 
probability of failure for software is p, where PFDSW=p, the number of failures f from n 






n ppCfFP  )1()(                                  (3.16) 
A prior conjugate is used to represent the changes of the parameter of interest p when extra 











                                       (3.17) 
Where B(a,b) is the Beta function, a and b are parameters chosen by the assessor to 
represent the prior belief of the parameter p. If no prior information is available, a uniform 
prior could be used with a=b=1. If f failures are found from n tests, the posterior distribution 
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Let the confidence level of the SRDT be C. The reliability requirement for a software test 
could be expressed as: 




To meet the requirement for reliability PFDsw and confidence C, the minimal successful 
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It is also the new prior distribution for next software testing phase. The posterior 
















                            (3.23) 
For a given requirement PFDsw and C, the smallest value n2 for failure free execution in 














                              (3.24) 
To continue this process, if the jth failure occurs on the sjth test executions, the number of 

































                         (3.25)           
A simplified stopping rule is developed to reduce the calculation for the process as 
described above. If j failures occurred, let the total number of executions until nj+1 failure 
free tests observed in the j+1th stage of test be N, where N=s1+s2+…+sj+nj+1, which is the 
minimal number executions required to successfully demonstrated reliability with 
acceptable confidence level. Regardless of when these failures are happened during the test, 
this test process can be treated equivalently as a single test process in which j failures are 
observed out of N executions. To meet the requirement of software reliability, the total 














                               (3.26) 
According to the analysis above, the stopping rule for the software testing only depends on 
the total number of executions and the total number of failures out of these executions. 
Given a reliability requirement PFDsw and C, the stopping rule for reliability test can be 




 Summary of the PSA-based Framework 
Safety must be considered as early as possible in an engineering project to avoid the loss 
of cost and time for design modification in late project stage. A PSA-based framework for 
safety assessment and safety management of nuclear-based hydrogen generation with Cu-
Cl cycle is developed in this chapter. The purpose of the PSA-based methodology is to 
improve the system safety through an in-depth probabilistic model of system behaviors in 
the accident. The PSA-based framework identifies the occurrence probability of accident 
and models the accident sequences and their probabilities. In addition, other safety related 
system features, such as response of safety system, plant operating conditions, degree of 
fault, alarms and human factors, could be analyzed with PSA methodology. The PSA-based 
framework involves the safety modeling with FTA and ETA and the risk control with SIS. 
With the help of the PSA-based safety assessment, the designer could easily find the 
weakness part of the design through a systematic way and take actions to improve the 
system safety in the early design stage. The scope of the methodology is not limited to the 









 Safety Assessment Result 
The safety assessment result for nuclear-based hydrogen production is represented in this 
chapter. The Cu-Cl cycle is still in its early design phase, no detailed design for Cu-Cl plant 
has been proposed so far. A preliminary safety assessment will be performed based on the 
currently available design phase information from public literature. The purpose of the 
preliminary assessment is to find the major hazard and risks in the Cu-Cl cycle, and assess 
their impact on the plant safety. As a conceptual design phase safety study, only severe 
accidents are considered. The safety assessment involves the hazard identification, fault 
tree modeling for initiating events, and event tree modeling for accident sequences. The 
numerical result is derived from the safety assessment, and this result is used to make a 
decision of whether additional safety management is required. 
 Risk and Hazard Identification 
To start a PSA, hazard and risk in a process or system need to be identified first. Hazard 
and risk in a process or system can be identified with different methods as discussed before 
in chapter 3. The new safety issue caused by nuclear-based hydrogen production is the 
major concern for the safety research about the nuclear-based hydrogen generation with 
Cu-Cl cycle. To identify the new risk and hazard in a novel Cu-Cl cycle design, expert 
judgment for nuclear hydrogen production is referred.  
According to the safety study proposed in previous literature [52], the following issues 




 Toxic chemical species: Hydrochloric (HCl) acid for the Cu-Cl cycle 
 Hydrogen production and storage in large quantity: Hydrogen safety for production 
and storage 
 Heat transfer fluids: additional thermo-hydraulic loop in the nuclear plant, LOCA 
must be analyzed 
Although Hydrochloric acid is mentioned as a potential risk, it is not classified as major 
risk which could cause severe accident in the Cu-Cl cycle, in this thesis.  
On one hand, the hydrochloric acid and hydrogen chloride has an irrigating and pungent 
odor even at very low concentration. It is very easy to detect when the HCl released into 
the environment. So, it is assumed in this thesis that the operator can detect and stop a 
leakage of HCl in early stage release by shutting down the process reactions.  
On the other hand, as an intermediate reactant, HCl recycles in the Cu-Cl thermochemical 
process, where it is generated and assumed within the reactions, as the process discussed 
in chapter 2. Although the total amount of HCl required for daily hydrogen production is 
very large, the actual amount of HCl exists in Cu-Cl cycle is small at one time. Therefore, 
the release of HCl could have minor effect, given a limited existing quantity in the Cu-Cl 
cycle.  
Thus, in this thesis, the LOCA from the heat transfer loop and the hydrogen accident caused 
by undesired leakage are selected as the major risks introduced by Cu-Cl cycle, which will 




 PSA for LOCA 
In a Cu-Cl thermochemical hydrogen production plant, power from NPP is supplied to the 
thermochemical reactions as energy source for water decomposition. The CANDU-SCWR 
design has a once through direct coolant loop, where no intermediate steam generator is 
used as the heat transfer interface between the reactor core and the load. Different NPP 
heat transfer system has been proposed, for example, Figure 4.1 shows the layout of a no-
reheating loop and single-reheat loop [53]. In general, the more heating loops a reactor 
have the higher energy efficiency could be achieved. However, the more heating loops will 
increase the system complexity and cost, so it is important to find an optimum layout for 
the cost and efficiency.  
Loss of coolant accident is the accident when coolant releases from reactor’s coolant 
system. In LOCA the nuclear reactor will loss part or total cooling ability, which is crucial 
to keep the reactor core in stable temperature and pressure. LOCA is the possible cause of 
some severe nuclear accident such as reactor core damage. The cause and effect of coolant 
release must be studied carefully to ensure a safer design for nuclear reactor. The result of 





(a) No-reheat Layout 
 
(b) Single-reheat Layout 




4.2.1 Heat Exchanger System 
A double pipe intermediate heat exchanger or a tube and shell heat exchanger can be used 
as an interface for transferring thermal energy from the reactor coolant system to the 
hydrogen production plant. The heat exchanger would be interfaced with the no-reheat 
alignment of coolant cycle or the single reheat alignment of the coolant cycle  [54], as 
shown in Figure 4.2. In both linkage options, a location on the coolant loop downstream of 
the reactor and upstream of the turbine would be a suitable location for the heat exchanger. 
In this case, SCW is the operating fluid on the primary loop of heat exchanger.Also, for the 
single reheat cycle, a second available location would be downstream of the steam reheat 
channels and the operating fluid is the superheated steam. In both linkages, the reactor 
coolant is bypassed to the heat exchanger to power the hydrogen production and mixed 
back with the reactor coolant main stream. Although the heat exchanger thermal hydraulic 
behavior could be different between these two linkage options due to the operating fluid 
property diverse, the safety performance of these two systems can be similar, since both 
systems share the same control and instrumentation structures. Also it is assumed only one 





(a) Intermediate heat exchanger for No-reheat layout 
 
(b) Intermediate heat exchanger for single-reheat layout 




4.2.2 FTA for LOCA 
According to the available information about the heat transfer loop for hydrogen generation, 
the piping and instrumented diagram (P&ID) of the heat exchanger is shown in Figure 4.3. 
For plant balance, the amount of coolant deliverd to hydrogen plant is determined based 
on the electrical and hydrogen generation demand, which is contoled by an control valve 
located at downstream of reactor core. Here, it is assumed that the basic process control 
system is applied to control the heat exchanger, and no extra safety system is used. The 
heat exhanger loop consists of: 
 Two isolation valves: isolate the heat exchanger from NPP coolant system 
 Pipes 
 Control valve: control the flow rate of heat exchanger primary loop 
 Intermediate heat exchanger: double pipe or tube and shell 
 Mix valve:  mix the operating fluid from downstream of heat exchanger with NPP 




















Steam from hydrogen plant
Steam to hydrogen plant
V-4 SCW to turbine
V-5
 
Figure 4.3 P&ID for heat exchanger 
The LOCA is caused by any leakage in the heat transfer interface piping system. To identify 
the imitating event frequency of a LOCA due to hydrogen production, a fault tree is 
developed to calculate the LOCA probability as a top event. The fault tree is shown in 
Figure 4.4. The failure rate of basic events probability is shown in Table 4.1. In particular, 
the pipe failure rate is related to the length of the pipe. According to the current Cu-Cl 
design specifications, the heat exchanger is located in the nuclear containment building. 
Thus, it is assumed the pipe length of heat exchanger primary loop is in the range of 100 















Table 4.1 Failure rate for heat exchanger primary loop 
Code Description Available Source* Selected value  Comment 
IVB Isolation valve break NUREG: 4.46E-8/h 
 E&R: 1.0E-8/h 
8.92E-08/h Two isolation 
valves in loop 
CVB Control valve break NUREG: 1.48E-8/h 
E&R: 1.0E-8/h 
1.48E-08/h  
MVB Mix valve break NUREG: 4.46E-8/h  
E&R: 1.0E-8/h 
4.46E-08/h  
PB Pipe break NUREG: 6.89E-10/h-ft 
E&R: 3.0E-9/h-ft 
9.84E-7/h 100m 





IVR Isolation valve 
rupture 
NUREG: 3.12E-9/h  
E&R: 1.0E-10/h 
6.24E-9/h Two isolation 
valves in loop 
CVR Control valve rupture NUREG: 1.03E-9/h  
E&R: 1.0E-10/h 
1.03E-9/h  
MVR Mix valve rupture NUREG: 3.12E-9/h  
E&R: 1.0E-10/h 
3.12E-9/h  
PR Pipe rupture NUREG: 1.38E-10/h-ft  
E&R: 3.0E-11/h 
4.5E-8/h 100m 










* NUREG [55]: NUREG/CR-6928 Industry-Average Performance for Components and Initiating 
Events at U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power Plants. 
E&R [56]: Component external leakage and rupture frequency estimates. 
 
The LOCA can be classified as small break loss of coolant accident (SBLOCA) and large 
break loss of coolant (LBLOCA) depending on the leakage size in the coolant system. 
Based on the FTA, the SBLOCA due to hydrogen production is 1.33E-6/h and the 
LBLOCA frequency is 9.02E-8/h. The original value is multiplied by 8760 to convert into 
the frequency of each year (1year=8760h), which is 1.17E-2/y for SBLOCA and 7.9E-4/y 
for LBLOCA. The result is in the same range of LOCA value in other CANDU NPP [57]. 
In this study, the SBLOCA and LBLOCA are combined together as an overall LOCA event, 
because the SCWR safety system performance is similar in both scenarios [58]. The total 
occurrence frequency of LOCA is 1.27E-2/y. 
4.2.3 ETA for LOCA 
The response of reactor safety system in the event of LOCA is analyzed as the accident 
sequences with the event tree model. The event tree analysis of CANDU-SCWR is based 






















Compared with existing Candu reactors which have a positive coolant void reactivity 
(CVR), the CANDU-SCWR has a negative reactivity on coolant voiding which will slow 
and eventually stop the fusion process in a LOCA. Similar as the other CANDU reactor, 
two independent shutdown systems will activate to ensure a minimal loss of inventory prior 
to trip. The residual heat generated from the LOCA is removed by the Emergency cooling 
system which consists of pumped or gravity-fed automated depressure system (ADS) and 
low-pressure core injection (LCI). An ADS is capable of sustaining blowdown cooling for 
a period of some 10s of seconds for rapid depressurization, and the LCI supplies water to 
the reactor core during emergency cooling conditions. If all the safety system failed, the 
use of a passive moderator cooling system (MPS) is the last line of defense to keep the core 
cool in the case when cooling capability is lost. The summary of LOCA outcomes is shown 
in Figure 4.6 
 
Figure 4.6 Summary of LOCA outcomes 
 
In Figure 4.5 the state OK-LCI implies the reactor core successfully gets long-term cooling 
from the LCI after the reactor shutdown. In the situation when the LCI fails and MPS works, 




limited core damage is caused due to the delay in core cooling from MPS (LC-MP). Core 
damage occurs when the MPS fails together with either the ADS or the LCI (CD-MPS1 
CD-MPS2). In summary, the severe core damage probability due to the interfacing with 
hydrogen production is 5.1e-9/y. This value is significantly lower than the safety target of 
the nuclear design basis failure frequency. This PSA result implies that the additional risks 
for nuclear safety caused by the linkage with hydrogen plant can be effectively eliminated 
by the nuclear safety system. So, no extra safety system is required to control risks from 
heat interface between NPP and hydrogen plant.  
 PSA for Hydrogen Accidents 
The hydrogen accidents such as fire and explosion are possible to cause a nuclear safety 
related accident if the blast wave of hydrogen explosion carries enough energy that destroys 
the safety barriers of the NPP. However, the impact of the hydrogen accident on the NPP 
highly depends on the amount of hydrogen storage inside the generation plant and the 
separation distance between NPP and hydrogen plant. The hydrogen release in the Cu-Cl 
process has been modeled with CFD [42] and the flammable hydrogen cloud distribution 
is shown in Figure 4.7. The mass of flammable cloud is between 1.76kg and 1.78kg, and 
the volume is about 400 m3. An explosion experiment with similar amount of hydrogen 
shows that the blast wave is 10kPa at about 62m form the edge of cloud, which cannot 
produce serious structural damage for NPP. The CFD analysis draws the conclusion that at 
a separation distance of 100m the explosion caused by hydrogen leakage to the open 





Hydrogen molar fraction after 500s of release from the high pressure pipe with 1 m/s wind (Top) 
and with 10 m/s wind (Bottom). The wind direction is from left to right. The red colour identifies 
the hydrogen cloud with a volumetric concentration equal or larger than 4%. 
Figure 4.7 Hydrogen release CFD [41] 
 
Because the layout of the nuclear-based hydrogen plant is still not finalized now in the 
design phase, it is hard to estimate how much hydrogen gas would be stored in the hydrogen 
facility and what is the final separation distance between two plants from existing research 
results. However, in accordance with the inherently safer design philosophy [59], the risks 
in the process could be reduced or eliminated by minimizing the quantities of hazardous 




significantly reduce the amount of hydrogen appears in the hydrogen plant to achieve a 
better inherent safety, by immediately deliver the hydrogen gas to the hydrogen storage 
facility settled at a safety distance from both the hydrogen plant and the NPP. Based on 
this assumption, the amount of hydrogen involved in a hydrogen accident is limited by the 
generating rate of hydrogen. Only the release from continuous hydrogen generation is 
analyzed. So the boundary for PSA of hydrogen accidents is limited within the hydrogen 
facility. 
4.3.1 Hydrogen Accidents Overview 
Hydrogen is a flammable, colorless, tasteless and odorless gas. As a hazardous resource in 
the process industry, hydrogen has unique properties, such as ease of leaking, wide range 
of combustible mixture and low-energy ignition. The production, distribution and use of 
hydrogen as a primary energy source pose new safety challenges. 
Hydrogen is generated with the CuCl/HCl electrolysis reaction. The main equipment used 
for hydrogen generation is the electrolyser, in which the hydrogen gas is produced at the 
cathode. The lab scale hydrogen production with electrolyser has been demonstrated at 
AECL [60]. In future large scale hydrogen production system, the industrial electrolyser 
will consist of a bunch of individual electrolysis cells. The reactant is delivered into each 
reaction cell evenly, and the hydrogen is generated at the cell’s cathode. hydrogen gas is 
collected from the cells through pipes inside of the electrolyser and delivered together to 
storage and distribution facilities. As mentioned before, the hydrogen storage and 




and the NPP. It is assumed that the basic control system is applied to keep a continuous 
reaction in electrolyser. 
4.3.2 FTA for Hydrogen Accidents 
The initiating event for a hydrogen accident is the release of hydrogen gas from the 
hydrogen production reactor. Hydrogen would release from any leakage of piping and 
equipment, or from the loss of containment of the electrolyser due to the reactor 
overpressure. Figure 4.8 shows the fault tree for the hydrogen release. The failure rate of 
basic events is shown in table 4.2. The pipe length is assumed in the range of several 10s 














Table 4.2 Failure rate for hydrogen generation 
Code Description Available values* Value used  Comment 
PSF Pressure sensor fail NUREG: 8.22E-7/h 8.22E-07/h  
CVF Control valve fail NUREG: 3.0E-6/h 3.0E-06/h Fail to control 
LCF Logic controller fail WSRC: 3.0E-6/h 3.0E-06/h  
RVF Relief valve fail NUREG: 7.71E-3/d 7.71E-3/d Failure per 
demand 
PB Pipe break NUREG: 6.89E-10/h-ft 
E&R: 3.0E-9/h-ft 
9.84E-7/h 100m 
HRB Hydrogen reactor 
break 
WSRC: 1.0E-7/h 1.0E-7/h Pressurized tank 
PL Pump leak WSRC: 1.0E-6/h 1.0E-6/h External leak 
VL Valve leak NUREG: 4.46E-8/h  
E&R: 1.0E-8/h 
4.46E-08/h  
*NUREG: NUREG/CR-6928 Industry-Average Performance for Components and Initiating 
Events at U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power Plants. 
E&R: Component external leakage and rupture frequency estimates. 




The initiating event probability of hydrogen release is 2.18E-6/h, and converted to a 
frequency of critical year it is 1.9E-2/y. From FTA, the hydrogen leakage in the piping and 
equipment contributes the most part of probabilities to cause a hydrogen release. While the 
risk of hydrogen release due to reactor overpressure is effectively mitigated by the relief 
valve.  
4.3.3 ETA for Hydrogen Accidents Sequences 
The sequences of a hydrogen leakage are modeled with the event tree as shown in Figure 
4.9. The hydrogen release event is selected as an initiating event for the ETA, and a 
frequency of 1.9E-2/y is assigned to it according to the FTA result. It is assumed hydrogen 
will continuously release to the environment, until an accidental fire and explosion occurs. 
The event tree is adopted from Bevi [62]. The classification of flammable substances 
defined by Bevi is shown in Table 4.3. The assessment is based on worst case scenario, 










Table 4.3 Classification of flammable substances [62] 
Category WMS category Limits 
Category 0 Extremely 
flammable 
Liquid substances and reparations with a flash point lower 
than 0 °C and a boiling point (or the start of a boiling 
range) less than or equal to 35 °C 
Gaseous substances and preparations that may ignite at 
normal temperature and pressure when exposed to air. 
Category 1 highly 
flammable 
Liquid substances and preparations with a flash point 
below 21 °C, which are not, however, extremely 
flammable. 
Category 2 Flammable Liquid substances and preparations with a flash point 




 Liquid substances and preparations with a flash point 
greater than 55 °C and less than or equal to 100 °C. 
Category 
4 
 Liquid substances and preparations with a flash point 






Hydrogen is extremely flammable gas. So, according to the classification criteria decribed 
in Bevi, hydrogen is classified as category 0 material. As a category 0 gas, the direct 
ignition probability given a hydrogen release is 0.2 with a rate less than 10 kg/s. If a direct 
ignition does not happen, a flammable cloud is formed due to the continuous hydrogen 
release and a delayed ignition would take place. The probability of delayed ignition defined 
in Bevi is 1-Pdirect ignition, which equals 0.8 in this case. Because the hydrogen is lighter than 
air, if a delayed ignition doesn’t happen either, the released hydrogen will disperse to open 
atmosphere. The hydrogen release has no harm in this scenario. In contrast, if a delayed 
ignition occurs, the outcomes of the event would be an explosion or a flash fire based on 
other condition in the delayed ignition, which can lead to worse result than a early fire. The 
conditional probability of an explosion is 0.4 given a delayed ignition, and the probability 

























The NE state means no harmful effect is given, which has a probability of 3.04E-3. In this 
accident scenario, neither the direct ignition nor delayed ignition occurs, so the released 
hydrogen will eventually disperse to the environment. The hydrogen plant is kept safe even 
a hazardous event is happening. Limited damage would be made from a jet fire (JF-LD), 
which is caused by hydrogen ignition in early release stage. It is assumed the emergency 
response action, such as fire extinguishing and emergency shutdown, will stop the release 
and prevent the hydrogen plant from further harm. The worst case is the explosion (EPL-
D) and flash fire (FF-D), when large amount of hydrogen is released and a final ignition 
occurs. The outcome frequency in the hydrogen release event is summarized in Figure 4.10. 
 
Figure 4.10 Summary of hydrogen release outcomes 
 
The outcome distribution for hydrogen accidents is shown in Figure 4.11. Given a hyrogen 
release condition, there is only 16% chance to avoid an accident. In more than 60% 
hydrogen release case, a severe hydrogen accident will occur in delayed ignition.The 
hydrogen release is the major risk in a nuclear-based hydrogen generation system. The 





Figure 4.11 Hydrogen accident distributions 
 
 Summary of the Safety Assessment Result 
A PSA for nuclear-based hydrogen generation with Cu-Cl cycle has been carried out in this 
chapter. Two major safety challenges caused by the linkage of the nuclear reactor and the 
hydrogen generation plant, LOCA and hydrogen accident, are analyzed with PSA- base 
methodology. The frequency of initiating events, which potentially lead to the final 
accident in the nuclear-based hydrogen generation system, is evaluated with the FTA. The 
probability of LOCA is 1.27E-2/y and the probability of hydrogen release is 1.90E-2/y 
Based on the result derived from FTA, the accident scenarios are modeled with event tree 
model. The ETA takes the system response into consideration when modeling the accident 
















nuclear accident is not the major safety challenge for the system safety of nuclear-based 
hydrogen generation system. The hydrogen accident has a much higher probability, which 
is 4.86E-3/y for explosion and 7.3E-3/y for flash fire. From the PSA-based safety 
assessment, the risks for nuclear reactor in the heat-exchanging interface are effectively 
controlled by the nuclear safety system. Thus, the nuclear accident has a small contributor 
to the total accident in the nuclear-based hydrogen. The major risk within the nuclear-based 
hydrogen generation system comes from the hydrogen accident. By comparing the PSA 
result with the CFD result, it is also conclude that the hydrogen accident has limited impact 
on the safety of nuclear reactor if an enough safety distance is applied. The major risks are 









 Safety Management of Hydrogen Accidents with 
SIS 
According to the PSA results, the risks due to heat transferring from NPP to hydrogen plant 
has minor impact for system safety, because the nuclear reactor safety system is able to 
reduce the LOCA accident. The hydrogen accident is the major risk in the nuclear-based 
hydrogen production plant. Severe hydrogen accidents including flash fire and explosion 
have a total occurrence frequency as 1.26E-2/y. In this chapter, the safety management for 
hydrogen accident with the SIS will be discussed. 
 LOPA for Hydrogen Accidents 
As discussed in previous chapters, safety is a combination of reliability and consequences 
of accident, to reduce the risk in a process for a given initiating event, two possible methods 
can be used. The first option is to reduce the probability of occurrence for the initiating 
event. This can be done by using better component or modifying the process to improve 
the reliability of unit and system. Another solution is to reduce the chance for accident 
sequences to reach an unsafe state. SISs are usually used in this case for risk prevention 
and mitigation.  
A LOPA is applied to determine the requirement SIL as the risk reduction level for SIS. 
LOPA is a semi-quantitative risk analysis technique, which applies following quantitative 




occurrence frequency of initiating event is estimated based on experience. However, in this 
thesis, the accident frequency is derived from more rigorous quantitative assessment with 
the FTA and ETA. The ETA results for hydrogen accident frequency is used as the accident 
likelihood. 
The possible independent protection layer for a hydrogen release can include: 
 general process design 
 basic process control system (BPCS) 
 alarms 
 operators  
 SIS 
In the previous safety analysis, performance of the basic design with BPCS has been 
assessed in quantitative model. Therefore, they do not meet the requirement of independent 
to be treated as IPL. Hydrogen is colorless and odorless gas, so that it is extremely hard to 
detect a hydrogen release by human. To get a conservative estimation, it is assumed 
operators will not give an effective response to stop the hydrogen release. Thus, in this 
LOPA the SIS is defined as the only IPL against the hydrogen release event. 




Table 5.1 Severity levels and mitigated event target frequencies [64] 
Severity Level Consequence Target Mitigated Event Likelihood 
Minor Serious injury at worst  No specific requirement 
Serious Serious permanent injury or up 
to 3 fatalities 
< 3E-6 per year, or 1 in > 330,000 
years  
Extensive 4 or 5 fatalities < 2E-6 per year, or 1 in > 500,000 
years 
Catastrophic > 5 fatalities Use F-N curve  
 
In this study the severity hydrogen accident is assigned as extensive, which requires the 
risk mitigation target as < 2E-6 per year. The risk reduction factor (RRF) required by the 
SIS is calculated as RRF=1.26E-2/2E-6=6300, and the PFDG required for the system is 
1.59E-4. According to the IEC 61508 standard, a SIL 3 (1000<RRF<10000) SIF is needed 
for hydrogen accident risk control. 
 SIS for Hydrogen Release 
A SIS is an additional protection layer on top of the basic control system to prevent people 




the release gas in the early leakage stage and perform a safety integrated function to stop 
the release process.  
In the nuclear-based hydrogen generation with Cu-Cl cycle, hydrogen gas is generated 
from the electrolyser by water splitting, so it is possible to terminate the release by stopping 
the hydrogen generation. The reaction in the electrolyser can be stopped by cutting down 
the voltage supply to the electrolyser. In addition, when an emergency stop is required to 
be performed in the electrolysis reaction, other reactions in the Cu-Cl loop must be stopped 
at the same time. The plant level emergency shutdown process is beyond the scope of this 
thesis. It is assumed the plant shutdown process after the emergency shutdown occurs in 
the hydrogen generating reaction will be controlled by the basic control systems. Only the 
single reaction shutdown system for the electrolyser is analyzed in this chapter. The block 








Figure 5.1 SIS block diagram for hydrogen release 
 
SIS usually has the same structure as other control systems but is designed to perform a 
safety critical function. Similar as other control loops, the SIS consists of 3 parts: the 




Sensors are the measuring part of SIS. It converts the physical parameter to an electrical 
signal, which can be read by the logic solver. The logic solver use microprocessors to 
handle the logic control for the SIS. The logic solver used in SIS is always programmable 
logic device, which can be configured to meet the requirement for different applications. 
Final element is the device controlled by the logic solver to perform a designated safety 
function.  
In this SIS design, a safety switch is used as the final element to control the electrical power 
supply to the hydrogen electrolyser. The operating flow of the SIS in the hydrogen accident 
is described as follows. In a hydrogen release accident, the release hydrogen gas is 
concentrated around the electrolyser. When a threshold of hydrogen concentration is 
reached, the release is initially detected by the sensor and at the same time, a signal will be 
transferred to the logic solver to indicate a leakage. Then the logic solver working 
continuously to processing the readings from the sensor, when a leakage is detected, it 
generates a control signal to stop the hydrogen release by shutting down the electrolysis 
reaction with the safety switch. If the SIS functions correctly, the hydrogen release can be 
stopped in the early leakage stage, and the hydrogen generating facilities can be brought 
back to the safety state before the occurrence of severe accidents. 
5.2.1 Sensor: Hydrogen Detector  
Hydrogen detector is an essential part of the safety system in the hydrogen generation plant. 
In the nuclear-based hydrogen generation, plant a wide area hydrogen sensor is required to 




There are different types of sensors, which can be used, for wide area hydrogen detection 
in nuclear-based hydrogen generation system [65], as listed in Table 5.2.  
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Among all the hydrogen detection techniques, the ultrasonic sensor has been proven in use 
in chemical process, which makes it a promising solution for hydrogen leakage sensing in 
nuclear-based hydrogen generation system. In the SIS designed to control hydrogen 
accidents, the ultrasonic sensor is use as the detector.  
Hydrogen release from pipe and valves produces ultrasonic turbulent pressure fluctuations. 
The gas release sensors are designed to receive and analysis these audio signals and detect 
a sudden ultrasonic signal from the background signals generated by process equipment. A 
commercially available sensor is shown in Figure 5.2, which is installed above pipe and 
equipment in a chemical plant [65].  
5.2.2 Logic Solver: Safety PLC 
Safety programmable logic controllers (PLC) are usually used as logic solver in SIS. The 
safety PLC plays the functions in a control loop as same as the functions played by 
conventional PLCs. However, the design and application of safety PLC has two critical 
safety objectives, which make it different from conventional PLC.  
 A safety PLC is designed to have a low failure rate, which makes it has a higher 
reliability than conventional PLCs.  






Figure 5.2 Ultrasonic leakage detector [65] 
 
5.2.3 Final Element 
Final element is used to perform the control functions to the system under control. Based 
on the application requirements, different types of final element can be used, such as 
actuators, valves, relays, or switches. In the hydrogen release protection SIS, a safety relay 




supply for the electrolyser. When a hydrogen release is detected, the logic solver will send 
a control signal to the safety relay to cut off the power for hydrogen reaction. 
 SIL Calculation for SIS 
From the requirement of IEC 61508, the SIL of any SIS must be quantitatively determined 
to ensure the risk reduction level which can be achieved by the SIS. To demonstrate the 
safety improvement of nuclear-based hydrogen generation system by using the SIS, a SIL 
calculation is given as a numerical example for safety assessment. It should be noticed that 
the purpose of this the example is for the purpose of demonstration. The result shown in 
this thesis is derived from simplified case study for SIS application in nuclear-based 
hydrogen generation. The design and assessment of a real application is more complex than 
the process shown in this paper. 
5.3.1 Safety Parameter for Components 
The safety parameters (failure rate) for components in SIS are shown in Table 5.3. The 







Table 5.3 Component failure rate 
Component Dangerous failure 
rate λD per hour 
Detected dangerous 
failure rate λDD per 
hour 
undetected dangerous 
failure rate λUD per hour 
Sensor 3.84E-6 3.77E-6 7.04E-8 
Logic Solver 2.26E-6 2.26E-6 7E-9 
Final Element 5E-8 1E-8 4E-8 
 
5.3.2 Component PFDG Calculation 
First let us assume a 1oo1 (1 out of 1) configuration for each component. For single element 
loop, the PFDG for the subsystem can be calculated with Equation 3.2 and 3.3.  
















                                    (3.3) 
In the calculation, the proof test interval is 1year (8760 hour) and MTTR is 8 hour. The 
average PFD for each part is derived with the value listed in Table 5.3, which gives: 




 PFDL of Logic Solver: 4.87E-5 
 PFDFE of Final Element: 1.76E-4 
From equation 3.4, the overall average PFD for the SIS is PFDG= PFDS+ PFLL+ 
PFDFE=5.15E-4.  
Form the numerical evaluation, the PFDG for the 1oo1 system satisfies the SIL 3 
requirement for risk reduction level with SIS. However, according to the previous analysis, 
the maximum allowed average PFD for the SIS must be no greater than 1.59E-4 to achieve 
the efficient mitigation likelihood target. Thus, according to the SIL assessment result, the 
1oo1 loop cannot meet the requirement for the risk reduction in protecting hydrogen release. 
Redundancy must be used to improve the system reliability. 

















As calculated with the simplified equation, the sensor and the final element have higher 
average PFD, which means the sensor and the final element is the weakness of safety in 
the SIS designed to control hydrogen accident. To improve the system safety for the SIS 
design, 1oo2 (1out of 2) channels with redundant components are used to improve the 
availability of these two subsystems. In a 1oo2 structure, two components are used in 
parallel and the redundant elements are working independently with each other, so that the 
system will function correctly if more than one component is working. In other words, the 
1oo2 channel is able to tolerate a single fault within the channel.  
The PFDG for 1oo2 system can be calculated with the following equation (Börcsök n.d.). 
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In the SIL assessment for 1oo2 loop, the common cause failure value β is taken as 2% 
and the detected common cause failure is 1%. The average PFD for logic solver and final 
element are calculated with the value listed in Table 5.3: 
 PFLL,1oo2 of Logic Solver: 6.22E-5 
 PFDFE,1oo2 of Final Element: 3.15E-5 
The average PFD of the SIS is PFDG= PFDS, 1oo2+ PFLL+ PFDFE, 1oo2=1.46E-4. 
According to the SIL assessment result, the SIS with 1oo2 channels of sensors and final 
element can satisfy the requirement of risk reduction level for SIL 3 system.  
The advantages of PSA based approach has been demonstrated from this example. In the 
general semi-quantitative assessment approach, the previous result (5.15E-4) shows that 
1oo1 loop can numerically meet the quantitative requirement for SIL 3 system. However, 
when combined with a PSA analysis, the result shows that an average PFD of 5.15E-4 
cannot guarantee enough mitigation target likelihood. Because the system average PFD 
is greater than the threshold value (1.59E-4) determined from the PSA assessment 
approach. Therefore, to effectively reduce the risks for hydrogen accident in the nuclear-
based hydrogen generation system, a more reliable SIS is required. By using 1oo2 
channels in the sensor and final element subsystems, the system average PFD is improved 
from 5.15E-4 to 1.46E-4, which is lower than the threshold average PFD requirement. In 
this application, the uncertainty introduced from the semi-quantitative assessment process 




 Software Requirement 
The Software requirement is derived with equation 3.15. Given the average PFD limit 
(1.59E-4) for the mitigation likelihood, the software reliability is PFDSW= (1.59E-4)-
(1.46E-4) =1.3E-5. To have potential risks of hydrogen release effectively removed by the 
SIS, the software component is the SIS must has a reliability higher than 1.3E-5.  
A software reliability demonstration test can be performed to achieve the designated 
software reliability. In industrial field, the 4-20mA current is used as the standard signal. 
The test cases of software can be simulated with random current input within 4-20mA. 
Given a confidence level 99% for the test result, the minimal number of executions N with 













                                          (5.2) 
Equation 5.2 is an integral equation which can be solved by numerical method (Please see 








Table 5.4 Requirements for SRDT 

















 Summary of Safety Management of Hydrogen 
Accidents with SIS 
In this chapter, a SIS is developed to control the hydrogen accident in the Cu-Cl cycle. 
First, based on the PSA-based safety assessment result, a LOPA is applied to determine the 
requirement for the risk reduction level for the hydrogen accident SIS. A SIL 3 grade SIS 
is designed with the ultrasonic leakage detection sensor. The SIL is calculated for the SIS 
with the simplified equation to evaluate the safety reduction level of the SIS design. 
According to the SIL assessment, the 1oo1 loop system configuration could numerically 
meet the risk reduction requirement for a SIL 3 system. However, after comparing with the 
PSA result, the 1oo1 SIS configuration is not able to provide the required safety reduction, 
so SIS with lower PFD must be achieved by modifying the existing design. By using 
redundancy channel in the sensor and final element subsystem, the new design with 1oo2 
sub-channels can get the safety goal for risk reduction. In addition, the quantification of 







 Conclusions and Future works  
 Conclusions 
Nuclear-based hydrogen generation is a promising technique for large-scale hydrogen 
production in the future. The linkage of NPP and hydrogen facility introduces new safety 
challenges for the co-generation plant. To address this problem, an integrated framework 
of PSA-based safety assessment and management for nuclear-based hydrogen generation 
system with Cu-Cl thermochemical cycle is developed in this thesis. The PSA-based 
framework includes the following safety management tasks: 
 System identification and problem allocation 
 Hazard and risk identification 
 FTA for occurrence probability of accidental initiating events 
 ETA for the accident sequences 
 LOPA to define the requirement of SIL for SIS 
 Designing and verification of the SIS 
The safety assessment has been carried out based on the early design of Cu-Cl cycle. In the 
safety assessment, two major safety concerns, LOCA due to direct heat transfer loop and 
hydrogen accident from Cu-Cl cycle, has been analyzed through PSA-based methods. The 




the current design, which needs further improvement. The occurrence probabilities of 
initiating event, which could cause severe accident in the nuclear-based hydrogen 
generation system, have been derived from the FTA. The FTA result gives a probability of 
1.27E-2/y for LOCA and 1.9E-2/y for hydrogen release. Based on the FTA result, the 
accident sequences are modeled with ETA to derive all possible outcomes and their 
probability. The ETA result shows that the nuclear safety issues due to the LOCA in the 
heat-transferring loop can be handled by the nuclear reactor’s safety system, so it has minor 
impact on the overall safety of nuclear reactor. The hydrogen accident is the major risk in 
the nuclear-based hydrogen generation plant, which can lead to a severe accident with a 
probability of 1.2E-2/ year. By comparing the PSA result with the CFD result, it is also 
determined, that the major impact for hydrogen accident is restricted within the hydrogen 
generation facilities only. 
The SIS is used as an independent protection layer to control and mitigate hydrogen 
accidents. The LOPA determines that a SIL 3 system is able to reduce the risks of severe 
hydrogen accident from 1.2E-2/y to 2E-6/y. Two different SIS configurations have been 
analyzed in this thesis. Although from a conventional assessment approach, a 1oo1 loop 
can numerically meet the SIL 3 requirement, when fitting into the PSA-based safety 
management framework, the overall risk reduction (5.15E-4) is not sufficient to guarantee 
the mitigation likelihood target (1.59E-4). A SIS with 1oo2 redundant channels for the 
sensor and final element subsystem can meet the safety requirement with average PFD for 
hardware as low as 1.46E-4 and software reliability no worse than 1.3E-5. The uncertainty 




quantitative PSA-based approach and achieve a more accurate result to effectively reduce 
the risks.  
 Future Work 
In this study, only two major safety challenges, LOPA, and hydrogen accident, in nuclear-
based hydrogen plant are analyzed within the PSA-based safety framework. As a complex 
process, there are many inherent risks in the Cu-Cl cycle, which need further study. A 
detailed safety assessment for the risks within the Cu-Cl thermochemical process can be 
performed in the future when more design specifics are available.  
The SIS used in this thesis is a simplified case study for the purpose of demonstrating the 
application of proposed PSA-based safety management framework. The future Cu-Cl 
hydrogen plant may need an integration of different systems with different control systems 
and safety systems, which should be more complex in structure and function than the SIS 
discussed in the thesis. The computer aided design tool is a promising solution for 
designing complex engineering systems. In the future study, systems automatic 
optimization design methods can be developed as a potential solution for designing large 
and complex SIS. 
For the energy balance of the nuclear-based hydrogen generation system, the hydrogen 
plant is working as a load for the NPP. The interaction between the hydrogen generation 
plant and the NPP should be studied in the future. From the control point of view, during 




disturbance will be introduced to the nuclear reactor side through the heat transfer interface, 
due to the effect of sudden change of reactor external load. In long-term response, the 
nuclear reactor will balance with the new load in another steady state through a reactor 
transient response. This load change effect is not deeply investigated in this thesis. This 
thesis assumes a relative simple system transition case that during the reactor transient 
response, the basic nuclear control systems are able to maintain the nuclear parameters 
within the safety range until a new plant balance is achieved. However, as a chemical 
process, the chemical plant may have different load feature than the conventional turbine 
generator load. The load balance and control for cogeneration should be further studied 
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 Appendix Numerical Solution for Equation 5.2 
result=0:1:1; 
for j=0:1:12; 
















     
if error<0; 
    low=N_current; 
     
    high=high*2; 
    N=high; 
end; 
if error>0; 
    high=(high+low)/2; 
    N=(low+high)/2; 
end; 
end; 
end; 
count=count+1; 
end; 
result(j+1)=N_current; 
end; 
